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In her book Constituent Power: A History (2020), Lucia Rubinelli aims to provide a
history of the “language” or, more precisely, the “words ‘constituent power’” (p.14).
She narrates this impressive history along five historical key moments, from
Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès to Hannah Arendt.
In the following, I will, first, comment on the methodology Rubinelli adopts throughout
the book and, second, focus on the fifth historical moment “Arendt and the
French Revolution” (Chapter 5). In this chapter, Rubinelli reconstructs Arendt’s
critique of “sovereignty as a theoretical category and as a principle of political
organization” (p.177) and her suggestion to replace it with ‘constituent power’. It is
an original contribution of the book to show that Arendt’s argument is in line with the
sense in which Sieyès originally put forward ‘constituent power’ – although Arendt
herself framed it as a critique of Sieyès which, according to Rubinelli, is rooted in her
inaccurate reading of Sieyès through Carl Schmitt.
Methodology
My methodological remarks are divided into three parts. The first two concern the
entire book, whereas the third focusses on Chapter 5. However, it will become
apparent that the first two points relate to the more substantial queries regarding
Chapter 5.
(a) As I have mentioned, Rubinelli aims to provide a history of the “language” and,
more concretely, the “words ‘constituent power’”. Such a history of the language
of constituent power stands in contrast both to a history of the “idea” (p.16) and to
a history of the concept of constituent power. However, Rubinelli only makes the
delineation from the history of the idea of constituent power explicit. But can the
book really be understood as a history of the words ‘constituent power’? At the very
least, it also seems to be a history of the words ‘pouvoir constituant’ and ‘potere
costituente’. Or, what exactly does Rubinelli mean by ‘words’?
(b) Relatedly, Rubinellis’s investigation is guided by her interest in the question
of “what the distinct contribution” of “the notion of constituent power brings to
the negotiation and systematization of the principle of popular power” (p.4). Two
questions arise here: First, does the necessary relation between ‘constituent power’
and ‘the principle of popular power’ that is implied by this guiding interest (see also
p.29) not point to a layer of a shared meaning, however thin, between the different
usages of the words ‘constituent power’? And, in turn, does this thin layer of shared
meaning not indicate that Rubinelli is actually not merely interested in a history of the
words ‘constituent power’, but rather in a history of an encompassing idea or concept
- 1 -
of constituent power? Second, does Rubinelli consider her engagement with ‘the
principle of popular power’, or simply ‘popular power’, in the book as an inquiry into
the concept, idea, or into the words of ‘popular power’?
(c) In the Introduction, Rubinelli states that in her engagement with the first two
historical moments she looks at the role that constituent power plays in “political
history” and that she investigates its role in “political and legal philosophy” when
engaging with the last three historical moments (p.27). As a side note: Since
Rubinelli is not interested in providing an analysis of the systematic role that
‘constituent power’ plays with respect to other concepts in political and legal
philosophy – like ‘democracy’, ‘popular power’ or ‘justice’ – it seems to me that, in
analogy to the focus on political history in the first two chapters, the focus in the last
three chapters is also on the history of political and legal philosophy. That being
said, the chapter on Arendt – being one of the last three moments – is accordingly
intended as an investigation into the meaning of the words ‘constituent power’ in
Arendt’s political and legal philosophy.
Reading the Arendt-chapter with this in mind, I noticed the way that Rubinelli
characterizes Arendt’s own method: Rubinelli writes that “[a]lthough constituent
power plays a capital role in Arendt’s theory of politics, she never theorized its
meaning and form systematically. This can be explained by the fact that constituent
power was, for Arendt, a concrete experience, a practice, and not an idea to be
theorized and elaborated upon” (p.193). This sounds to me as if Rubinelli was
claiming that it would actually be wrong to analyze Arendt as providing a philosophy
of constituent power. Relatedly, Arendt’s critique of sovereignty (which gives rise to
her account of constituent power) can, according to Rubinelli, be understood as a
critique of a particular kind of philosophical perspective: “To a large extent, Arendt’s
antipathy towards sovereignty was motivated by its abstract and ideal character.
Sovereignty was the result of the philosophers’ preference for solipsist speculation
over concrete political action, which resulted in the substitution of political freedom
with individual control over oneself and over the course of one’s action – the free
will.” (p.192)
A number of different layers between philosophy and politics can thus be
distinguished: i) Arendt’s philosophy (or other kind of theoretical engagement with)
constituent power. How are we to understand what Arendt is doing?; ii) Arendt’s
critique of philosophy; iii) the political circumstances of Arendt’s writing in their
relation to Arendt’s theory of constituent power; iv) the political history Arendt is
particularly interested in, namely the foundation of Rome and the French and
American revolutions – again in relation to Arendt’s theory of constituent power; v)
Rubinelli’s own authorial voice and how it relates differently to Arendt’s theory of
constituent power than to, say, Sieyès’ usage of constituent power in the first chapter
(as one of the two chapters in which Rubinelli looks at political history rather than
political and legal philosophy). In Rubinelli’s view, how are these different layers
supposed to be related exactly?
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Sovereignty, Constituent Power and Regular Politics
Rubinelli claims that from Arendt’s body of work we can distill a common thread
of the critique of sovereignty that leads to Arendt’s alternative idea of constituent
power. Rubinelli engages with Arendt’s early writings from the 1930s, in which
Arendt comments on “the ongoing international effort to find a homeland for the
Jews” (p.177), and her books The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), The Human
Condition (1958), and On Revolution (1963).
Let me start by presenting the bare bones of Rubinelli’s reconstruction of Arendt’s
critique of sovereignty and her consequent account of constituent power. What
is at stake in Arendt’s critique of sovereignty is the idea of the sovereignty of the
people – not, say, the sovereignty of a monarch. However, Arendt’s critique of the
sovereignty of the people can be formulated as the critique of the fact that this
concept articulates political authority after the French Revolution analogously to
political authority in a monarchy. Arendt is particularly critical of the equation of
‘people’ with ‘nation’ in the idea of the sovereignty of the people. Arendt saw this
concept of the sovereignty of the people – in which people equals nation – as key to
understanding the “decline of the nation state” (p.180) in the totalitarian regimes of
the first half of the 20th century. One important reason for this is that the “sovereignty
of the nation” is seen as somewhat more absolute than the “sovereignty of the
monarch”. And this, in turn, is because: “the nation became both the source and the
recipient of power” (p.181, emphasis added). This overlap between the source and
the recipient of power seems central to understanding the problems of sovereignty
and the difference between ‘sovereignty’ and ‘constituent power’ (see also p.199). I
would like to invite Lucia Rubinelli to elaborate more on this.
If we accept Arendt’s critique of sovereignty, in what sense can constituent power
serve as an alternative (On Revolution)? Arendt’s preference for constituent power
over national sovereignty corresponds to her claim that the French Revolution failed
because the people did not participate in constituting the new order, whereas the
American Revolution was initially successful because the people actually exercised
their constituent power. But what does it mean to say that the people exercised their
constituent power, or more generally, what does it mean for the people to exercise
their constituent power in any historical moment? Rubinelli distills three features from
Arendt (p.194f.):
• (1) “[I]t [constituent power] can only be exercised when the founding act is
immanent” (p.194). This means that when constituent power is exercised, the
moment of founding is not understood in relation to the prior will of the nation (cf.
p.196) or anything else that transcends the practice of founding itself.
• (2) The people, and not merely their representatives, must actually participate
“[…] in the constitution-making process” (p.194).
• (3) The third feature explains how this second feature may be realized.
According to Rubinelli, Arendt argues that “[p]eople, organized in local councils,
should discuss, deliberate and eventually adopt the constitutional text drafted
and proposed by a committee created ad hoc.” (p.195) These are “practices of
direct democracy rather than representation” (p.196).
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The elaboration of what makes a process of founding successful – successful in
the sense of having been determined by the constituent power of the people – is
followed by a discussion about the question of how it is supposed to ‘live on’ in the
“regular working of politics” (p.199). Rubinelli again describes three institutional
elements of a political system in which constituent power ‘lives on’ according to
Arendt (pp.200–203):
• (I) Such a political system must be a “federal regime, based upon decentralized
governmental structures, which reduce the delegation of power to a
minimum” (p.200). This shows Arendt’s preference for council democracy over
representative democracy.
• (II) Relatedly, such a system must be opposed to “European
parliamentarism” (p.202).
• (III) Such a system must also display “instruments to incorporate political
change in the constitution without endangering its authority” (p.202). According
to Rubinelli’s reconstruction of Arendt, an example for such an instrument is the
American Supreme Court.
With regard to the question of how constituent power may ‘live on’ in a political
system, Rubinelli concludes that: “the people’s constituent power could be kept
alive not only through the people’s participation in councils [feature (I), E.N.] but
also through processes of constitutional revision, enshrined in the Supreme Court’s
work of augmenting the foundation [feature (III), E.N.].” (p.203) This conclusion
leaves me a bit puzzled about the exact relationship between constituent power
and the three institutional features of a constituted order in which constituent power
lives on: In what sense is constituent power kept alive in councils (feature (I))?
As Rubinelli states shortly after the passage quoted above, is this not more an
exercise of popular power simpliciter (p.202, cf. p.205)? This leads me to a more
general question: How do constituent power and popular power relate (cf. the
third alternative narrative of the book, p.227f.)? Is constituent power a particular
kind of popular power? More precisely, is constituent power popular power related
to the founding or the change of constitutions, or does it also include, say, less
formalistic and/or radical or direct democratic elements of participation in constituted
democracies? Or should the idea of constituent power pave the way to getting rid of
the distinction between extraordinary politics and ordinary policymaking altogether
(cf. p.220 on Negri and Hardt)?
***
At this point, the methodological questions (a,b) I raised at the beginning of my
comment resurface: Do we not need at least a pre-conception of the meaning of
constituent power in order to write an intelligible history thereof? The pre-conception
at work in this book seems to be that constituent power is in some specific sense
related to popular power or is itself a specific kind of popular power. But would it then
not make sense to include theories of this particular kind of popular power, even if
they do not use the language of constituent power (e.g. verfassunggebende Gewalt),
and to exclude certain usages of the words ‘constituent power’ as off-topic (e.g. the
‘constituent power of a monarch’)?
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